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Abstract  
It is only recently that economic theorists have faced the fact that the proposed 
allocation mechanisms in economies with public goods might have bad incentive 
properties. In this paper we introduce a new planning procedure such that truthful 
revelation of the marginal rates of substitution between public goods and the private 
good is a dominant strategy at each instant along the procedure, i.e. we obtain much 
stronger incentive properties than in the planning procedures proposed in the 
literature. We demonstrate the convergence of this new planning procedure for 
economies with a single public good and explore its properties-finding mixed 
results-in more general systems. 
I. Introduction 
It is only recently that economists have faced the fact that the proposed 
allocation mechanisms in economies with public goods might have bad incentive 
properties. Malinvaud (1971) presented three dynamic planning procedures 
for such economies, in each of which there exists the incentive for incorrect 
revelation of preferences. I n  section 6 of his paper, Malinvaud comments on 
this problem and pursues one of his mechanisms under the assumption that a 
Nash equilibrium in professed preferences is found a t  each date. See also 
Roberts (1976). In  this paper we introduce a new planning procedure with 
incentive properties stronger than those possessed by the Malinvaud mecha- 
nism. We demonstrate its convergence for economies with a single public 
good, and explore its properties-finding mixed results-in more general 
systems. 
Recent research on the incentives problem has proceeded along two prin- 
ciple lines. Clarke (1971), Hurwicz (1972), Groves (1973) Groves and Ledyard 
(1977) have used a global criterion. They have endowed agents with messages 
aimed a t  effectively transmitting the relevant aspects of their whole utility 
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functions. In a different spirit Drkze and de la Vallde Poussin (1971) and 
Malinvaud (1971) have constructed a continuous time procedure for which 
the messages of agents at  each instant are their rnarginal rates of substitution, 
that is, local information about their preferences is t ran~mit ted .~  
These two approaches have developed witho~zt much interaction and with 
somewhat contrasting results as noted by Roberts (1976). The main purpose 
of this paper is to show the analogous role played by the assumption of 
separability of utility functions in global approaches on the one hand and 
the assumption of myopia in local dynamic approaches on the other. 
We construct a dynamic version of the Clarke-Groves mechanism which, 
in a static model, "essentially" yields a Pareto optimal allocation with 
revelation of the truth as a dominant strategy when utility functions are 
separable. We show that in the dynamic version the same results obtain for 
non separable utility functions when we postulate a myopic form of behavior. 
The symmetric role of separability and myopia is easily understood, when one 
realizes that at  each instant, the welfare of an agent, represented by the 
time derivative of the utility function is linear in the time derivative of the 
quantity of public good and the time derivative of the quantity of private 
good. 
Another attractive feature of the continuous time dynamic procedures in 
contrast with global methods concerns informational requirements. First, the 
agent has only to reveal his preferences along the actual path followed by the 
process and not for the whole range of the variables. Second, the level of 
accuracy that can be obtained from agents willing to transmit their preferences 
depends on the way they are elicited and to ask local questions along a path 
seems to be a good way to proceed. Moreover the maximization problem of 
the center is much simpler at  each instant-though of course it must be done 
infinitely quickly. 
In  Section 11, we describe our mechanism uith a single public good. 
Generalizations to several public goods are provided in Section 111. 
11. A Procedure with One Private Good and One Public Good 
We consider an economy with N consumers and one private good, denoted y, 
and one public good, denoted x. Let ui(x,y') be the utility function of the 
i'th consumer as a function of his consumption of public good and private 
good respectively; ui( .,.) is assumed to be strictly concave and twice contin- 
uously differentiable with: 
Roberts (1976) and Henry (1976) have shown that under myopic behavior if a Nash 
equilibrium in announced strategies is obtained a t  each instant, truthful revelation is not 
obtained but a Pareto optimum is reached. This interesting result is difficult to  interpret 
because a discrete formulation of the ?\'ash game a t  each instant t shows that the Nash 
equilibrium is unstable. I n  a discrete formulation of RIDP, Henry (1976) shows theneed for 
an assumption like "when agents are indifferent, they say the truth" to obtain stability. 
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aui 
u:(x, Y') = (x, y') 80 
a d
uL(x,y') =- (2, y') >0. 
ay 
The marginal rate of substitution between public good and private good 
is denoted: 
We assume that the utility function is defined for any value y' E R, so that 
we do not have to worry about bankruptcy (see, however, the discussion below 
for different ways of treating bankruptcy). 
Finally, consumers have endowments (wi) in the private good. 
The production possibilities are described by a twice differentiable 
increasing function G(x) which specifies the amount of private good necessary 
to produce any given amount x of the public good. 
The marginal cost of producing an additional unit of public good is denoted 
y(x) with 
y(x) > 0 and yt(x)>0 if x >0, y(0)=0, yl(0)=0. 
Lemma 1. An allocation z =(2, yl, ...,yN) is a Pareto optimum iff 
Proof. Obvious. 
We consider a (time) continuous procedure starting a t  date 0, from the 
allocation (0, wl,  ..., wN).At each instant t, each agent is asked to report his 
marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the private good. 
Let yi(t) be his stated marginal rate of substitution a t  date t. There is no 
priori restriction on the functions yi( .), i=1, ...,N. 
Let 6' be the cost share imputed to agent i with 2E16'= 1. 
At each date t, we define the set of pivotal individuals P(t) as follows: 
An agent is pivotal if his statement leads to a, different sign for the aggregate 
net willingness to pay. 
The procedure is then defined by the following system of differential 
equations: 
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Equation (2.3)specifies the adjustment speed of the quantity of public good, 
according to the sign of the aggregate net willingness to pay. 
Equations (2 .5 )and (2.6)describe the change in the endowment of private 
good for pivotal and non pivotal agents. Consider first the mechanism 
without the surplus &t). For non-pivotal agents the change in private good 
is -d iy(x( t ) )  ~ ( t ) ,  i.e. the imput,ed cost of the additional unit of public good. 
In  addition, a pivotal agent has to pay xl+,[y'(t) -6'y(x(t))] 2( t ) ,  i.e. the sum of 
net willingnesses to pay of the other agents. If the procedure was run this way 
it would generate a surplus a t  each date since 
instead of 
from (2.2).  
I n  order to close the system we must redistribute this surplus. This is done 
by giving back ( l /N )A ( t )equally to every agents1 
Now, we have to make behavioral assumptions to explain how agents deter- 
mine their answers. We will consider two possibilities based on our previous 
work on the sta,tic model, see Green & Laffont (1976). 
Assumption 1. Each agent has a myopic behavior, i.e. defines his optimal 
answer a t  date t by considering only the increase of utility he can obtain a t  
date t ,  namely 
More general ways of distributing the surplus could of course be assumed, as long it is 
distributed among a large enough group. 
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This is, of course, the critical assumption which allows us to bypass the 
separability assumption, by considering at  each instant the linearized approxi- 
mation of the utility function which is indeed separable. 
Assumption 2. For large N ,  each agent neglects the impact of his answer on 
( i / ~ ) S ( t ) ,in determining his optimal answer. 
The procedure with A 2  is referred to as procedure A.l The justification for 
assumption 2 is that if agents think that the marginal rates of substitution of 
the others are an independent random sample from some population, then the 
empirical distribution of SI I INwould converge to a distribution with finite 
mean and variance. Therefore SIN would be statistically negligible. See 
Green & Laffont (1978, Chapter 9 ) .  Of course the fact that &'/I%is small 
does not by itself mean that its response to changes in y i ( t )would be negligible. 
However, we have shown in Green et al. (1976)that as N becomes large, the 
optimal strategy of each agent converges to the truth. Assumption 2, therefore, 
is justified as an approximation in this sense. 
Let us denote u i ( y ' ( t ) ,  y - ' ( t ) )  the anticipated change in utility for agent i, 
if he says y i ( t )  when the other agents answer y r i ( t )= ly l ( t ) ,...,yi- l( t) ,  
?pi+l(t),.. . ,yN(t )I . 
Lemma 2. Under A1-A2, revelation of the truth at each instant t ,  i s  a dominant 
strategy. 
Proof. We want to show that 
for any y i ( t ) ,  y-'(t).  
Below, we check that it is true for several cases leaving symmetric situa- 
tions to the reader. 
and, 
2 (y i ( t )-S fy ( t ) )<0 
i+i 
then 
The transfer function without the rebate used a t  each instant is not exactly a Clarke- 
Groves mechanism; the exact transposition of the Clarke mechanism would give larger 
surpluses and require a t  the equilibrium additional payments which might destroy stability 
with non separable utility functions (at least in a discrete version of the procedure). 
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and, 
then 
If 
2yi(t)+ni( t )=y ( t )
i+i 
and 
we know that 
and hence, 
A' =ue(x(t) ,  yi( t))  [-ni( t )+diy ( t ) ]  >0. 
If 
and, 
then 
A' =u t (x ( t ) ,  y1(t)) [ni(t)-diy(t)+ 2 ( ~ ' ( t )-d'y(t))]=0. 
I+ i Q.E.D. 
This lemma is not covered in Green & Laffont (1976), but is closely related. 
In  that paper, we break a tied situation in favor of one of the two projects 
arbitrarily. To reach an equilibrium in the dynamic procedure, we must 
introduce a third project when 2,nf=y ,  namely, keeping the status quo and 
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neither increasing nor decreasing the level of the public good. Ties are now to 
be broken in favor of this decision. However, there are here further constraints 
on the utility functions (linearity in public good) which with A2 still make 
truthful revelation a dominant strategy. 
Lemma 3. A stationary point of the procedure is a Pareto optimum. 
Proof. Obvious. 
Assumption 3. There exists a level of public good production 5 such that for 
any (yl, ...,yN), 2,ni(Z, yi) -745) is negative. 
Theorem 1. The procedure A converges to a Pareto optimum. 
Proof. At date zero 4 0 )  > 0  from our assumptions. 
At each instant, condition (2.2) of Pareto optimality is satisfied because 
the procedure is closed; x(t) cannot become negative for t>O because 
since 2,n,  - y  is continuous by the intermediate value theorem it would have 
to take the zero value where the procedure would stop. 
Therefore z(t)is increasing and bounded by d (see assumption 3). Therefore, 
i t  converges to x* >O. Let (yl*,...,yN*) be the associated distribution of the 
private good. 
From (2.3) x* =0, implies I E l  nt(x*, yi*) =~ ( x* ) ,and yi* =0, i =1, ...,N 
hence the asymptotic Pareto optimality. Q.E.D. 
The procedure converges in a finite amount of time T* defined as 
The existence of solutions to the system of differential equations is no problem, 
since the right hand side equations are continuously differentiable, with the 
exception of (2.3) which does not matter because 2 never changes sign. The 
continuity of the right-hand side of (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) in spite of the introduc- 
tion of pivotal agents is due to the fact that when an agent becomes a pivot or 
ceases to be a pivot the quantity XI,, (y f ( t )-dfy(t)) takes the value zero. 
I t  is important to observe that this procedure is not individually rational, 
in the sense of improving the welfare of everybody with respect to the initial 
situation, unless very strong assumptions are made (such as "the public good 
is necessary") which de facto make the initial position the worst for every 
agent. I t  is easy to see in procedure A that the utility of an agent increases 
whenever he is pivotal since: 
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However, when he ceases to be pivotal his utility may well decrease, if his 
net willingness to pay (n i -d 'y)  is negative and if the rebate he gets ( 1 / ~ ) & '  
does not compensate him fully. 
In  an economy where the initial situation corresponding to a distribution 
of the private good has no reason to be fair, the requirement of individual 
rationality looses much of its appeal. It is clear that the spirit of the procedures 
proposed here is to go beyond the Pareto optimal criterion by using a cardinal 
representation of the utility functions and by maximizing the social welfare 
represented by the sum of utilities. By choosing equal shares of the cost, the 
procedure can be made equitable in the following sense: if the agents con- 
sider the procedure before knowing their own preferences, in the spirit of the 
Rawlsian approach, no particular agent is favored. However, this procedure 
is certainly not optimal for extremely risk averse agents, as required by 
Rawls. 
The lack of individual rationality creates also the possibility of bankruptcy. 
If one may consider that we are dealing with small projects relatively to the 
wealth of the agents, then, there is no real problem of bankruptcy. But 
if i t  is desired to handle big public projects with such a method, bankruptcy 
must be faced. An agent may be bankrupted for two reasons. On the one 
hand he may be unable to pay his ex ante imputed share of the project; in 
that case one may legitimely assume that the Center knows the endowments 
in sufficient detail so that he does not impute shares which could bankrupt 
some agents. On the other hand, he may have to make pivotal payments 
beyond his means. Note, however, that the mechanism is such that a pivotal 
payment is always less than the net marginal willingness to pay. Therefore, 
if one bounds the marginal rate of substitution, it is possible to limit the 
eventual pivotal payments to an amount below the endowment net of the 
cost share. 
The procedure described above may be slightly modified to allow different 
interpretations. Instead of redistributing the surplus one may choose to 
destroy i t  in order to be sure of not distorting incentives. The loss in efficiency 
can then be measured in the private good as: 
where T* is the convergence time of the procedure. 
To bound the per capita efficiency loss, and to show that it tends to be 
small in large systems, we consider an economy with ren agents defined as 
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follows. There are n agents described as above, and the economy consists of 
an r-fold replica of these agents. Let us assume that net willingnesses to 
pay always lie in the interval [ -A ,  +A].  
A bound on L is constructed by considering the first date, Tl(r),s t  which 
pivotal payments by any agent are possible (that is, the first date at  which 
ziy i-y =A) .When pivotal payments are being made, the rate of payments 
at  any instant cannot be greater than rnA/2. Therefore rnA/2. (T* -Tl(r)) 
is an upper bound for L. 
We approximate T,(r) by writing the Taylor series for 
around T*,where it is zero by definition. This is 
(t-T*)2..Z(t)= ( t-T*)z(T*)+---Z(€) for ZE(t, T*). 2 
Since z(T*)=0 and ~ ( 2 )=r 2rX1i; (€) we have 
Thus 
By bounding i,(€)below ure have a bound on L such that the per capita 
efficiency loss, Llm, is decreasing with r. 
The bound on vi(€)depends on both the dynamics of the process and on the 
underlying utilit'y functions. If these utility functions are separable, so that 
y depends only on y, then vi(Z)will be bounded if there is a lower bound on y'. 
More generally, the bound on vi(t)cannot be derived without further 
restrictions. For example, in the case of homothetic utility functions, assump- 
tions on the elasticity of substitution and on the curvature of the cost func- 
tion would suffice. 
Therefore, we have developed a continuous time procedure which at  the 
cost of a somewhat bounded rationality or a slight inefficiency gives satis- 
factory answers both in terms of incentives and efficiency. 
111. Several Public Goods 
The generalization of the above results to the case of several public goods 
faces the difficulty of proving stability. In a first subsection we construct a 
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procedure converging to a Pareto optimum when the utility functions are 
separable.1 In  subsection B, me discuss the difficulties of proving stability 
without such an assumption. 
A. Separability 
We assume here that the utility functions of the N agents can be written: 
ui(x ,  yi)  = y f+vi(x,, ...,x,), 
where K is the number of public goods and x =(x,, ...,2,). The other assump- 
tions and notations of Section I1 are trivially generalized here. 
A Pareto optimum allocation z =(x,,...,x,, yl, ...,yN) is now characterized 
by: 
We define imput,ed 'cost shares for each public project a;, i =  1, ...,N ;  
k =  1 ,  ...,K, as well as a set of pivotal individuals Pk(t )for each public project. 
The procedure is then defined by: 
Sk(t)= + 1 if 2 &(t) -yk(x( t ) )> 0 
i 
with 
d;=O if i&P k ( t )  
d i =  1 i € Pk(t) .  
It is immediate to show that under the analogue of A1-,42 (Al' ,  A2') 
truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy for each agent. 
Note however that the informational requirements are weaker in this procedure than if 
we used directly a Groves mechanism which elicits the whole functions vl ( . ) .  
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Assumption 3'. For any k, there exists a level of public good production 
2, such that for any x-, =(xl, ...,xk-l, x,+~, ...,xK) and any yl, ...,yN 
is negative. 
The syst,em of differential equations so described is a complex one, in 
particular because of a number of discontinuities in the right hand side. First, 
the speed of adjustment for the different public goods is discontinuous. In 
addition, when the speed of adjustment for a given public good changes sign 
a t  instant to the set of pivot,al agents changes, and eventhough the sum of 
pivotal payments is the same when 
t -t to t-tt,, at  t= t o  
or when 
t > to t < to 
this sum is zero a t  to because E=O.  Also, the rate of monetary transfer to an 
agent who a t  l i =O  ceases to be (or becomes) pivotal is discontinuous. Note 
however t,hat when the speed of adjustment is unchanged, the transfer 
an agent who ceases to be (or becomes) pivotal is unchanged. Therefore, the 
system of differential equations has only discontinuities at  instants when the 
quantities of some (and not all) public goods are stati0nary.l 
Assuming the existence of a solution to (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) we can then 
prove. 
Theorem 2. Under Al',  AZ', A3', the procedure A with many public goods con- 
verges to a Pareto optimum if preferences are "separable". 
Proof. Clearly a stationary point of the procedure is a Pareto optimum. 
Consider the following Lyapunov function: 
I t  may be hoped that the methods of Champsaur e t  al. (1977) can be used to establish the 
existence of solutions to (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). To do so one would consider an analogue 
system of differential equations in which the right hand side is set valued and contains the 
value given by (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6)a t  every point. Specifically, one chooses these sets so as 
to  form the smallest convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence containing the 
required discontinuous function. For example, (3.4) would be modified to read 
A solution to such a system is a function whose derivatives are members of the indicated 
sets a t  every point in time. Solutions to this convexified system are known to exist, and 
their properties are developed in Castaing & Valadier (1969). The method of Champsaur 
et al. (1977) is to show that such solutions also satisfy the original system. At present this 
is an open question. Analogous extensions of discontinuous processes in economics have 
been made by Henry (1972) and Hori (1975). 
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Clearly, 
v ( ~ ) > o  and V ( t ) = ~ [ ~ i + ~ n k ~ ~ l .  
1 k 
Using (3.6) we have 
and $'(?) =O  iff the allocation is Pareto optimum. 
From A3', with (3.7), q must be bounded above for every k. Therefore 
V( t )must be bounded above. 
V(t )is an increasing function of time which is bounded above. Given that 
solutions exist, theorem 6.2 in Champsaur, Drkze and Henry (1977),implies 
that the procedure is quasi stable--that is, any limit point of any trajectory 
is a stationary point. It is immediate then to obtain stability by using the 
strict quasiconcavity of the utility functions and the fact that any stationary 
point is a Pareto optimum. Q.E.D. 
B. Instability without Separability 
Without separability the transfers in the private good may disturb the stability 
of the procedure. Suppose there are two public goods. With appropriate 
concavity assumptions, it is clear that the change in the production of public 
goods brings us closer to the Pareto surface as 12,nf,-7,I, k = 1,2 decrease. 
We approach a Pareto allocation with given levels of public good productions. 
But, in the procedure, we are obliged to make transfers in the private good to 
an agent who will favor a different structure of public goods. But. as we 
approach this ddferent mixture, transfers are now made to another agent 
who reverses the trajectory towards the previous combination. During a 
cycle, the utility level of one agent increases and then decreases while for 
another agent it is the opposite. This is made possible by the lack of 
individual rationality of the procedure. This phenomenon cannot occur with 
separability since the transfers in private good do not affect the decisions 
about public goods. 
Hereafter we give the elements of an example with piecewise linear utility 
functions where instability occurs. 
The example involves two public goods with constant marginal costs equal 
to 2 and two agents who share equally the costs of the public goods: 
d1=a2 =$. Let M i  be the initial amount of private good hold by each agent, 
i=l , 2 .  M i  is la~ge  nough so that no bankruptcy occurs along the trajectories. 
The preferences are locally defined along the trajectory as follows; appro- 
priate increasing transformations can be used to make these preferences 
continuous. 
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Fig. 1 
Agent I 
For MI-2  < y1 <M1 
0< x 1= x 2< 1  then U1=2x, +2x2+y1 
For i l l1-2 .75<y1<M1-2 
X I  = 1 
1 < x 2< 2  then U1= x1 +ax2 +y1 
For MI-3.25 <y1 <M1 -2.75 
x1+x2 =3 
1 <x1<2 ,  1  < x 2< 2  then U1=3xl+y1 
For MI-3.25<y1<M1-2 
x, = 1 
1 <x l  < 2  then U1= 1 .5x1 +x2 +y1 
Agent 2 
For M2 - 2< y 2<M2  
O<x l=x2<1  then U2=2x1+2x2+y2 
For M2-3 .25<y2<M2-2  
X I  = 1 
1  < x 2< 2  then U2=xl +4x2+y2 
x1 +x2 =3 
1< x l < 2 ,  1 < x 2 < 2  then U2=0.5x1+1.5x2+y2 
For M2-3 .25<y2<M2-2  
x2= 1 
1< x 1< 2  then U2 0 . 2 5 ~ ~= +x2 +y2. 
In  the space of public goods the trajectory is as shown in Fig. 1. 
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In  the region (0) (see Fig. l),there is no pivot, and both projects are con- 
structed in increasing quantity. Then we enter region (1)with incomes M1-2 
and M2 -2 for the two agents. Then agent 2 is a pivot for the second public 
good and he has to pay 4with a rebate of a, i.e. 4. In  region (1) his income 
decreases from M2 -2 to M2-3.25 since he has also to pay his share of the cost 
of the second public good i.e. 1. Agent 1 on the other hand receives $ and has to 
pay his share of the cost. In region (2), agent 1 is a pivot for public good, because 
he causes i t  to  be increased, and a pivot for public good 2 but in the opposite 
sense. Finally in region (3), agent 2 is a pivot in the downward direction. Then 
we are back a t  A and cycle indefinitely in (I), (2), (3). 
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